All of our Choices are Predetermined Essay Example for Free

All of our Choices are Predetermined Essay The Universe appears to be governed entirely by laws, studies of physics seem to show that atoms follow an extremely predictable pattern of cause and effect. This presents a difficult problem for philosophy; if all physical matter is governed by the laws of cause and effect, and we ourselves are comprised of physical matter, how could it be so that any choices we make could be seen to be free? The suggestion that our choices are set out by cause and effect is known as Determinism. Philosophers such as Ted Honderich have argued for determinism and for the consequences that it cancels out free will. It seems insensible to argue that we are not in the least bit determined, and almost all people know from personal experience that people act in a relatively stable and predictable way. For example, if I were to ask my father if he wanted tea or coffee, I would know that he would want coffee based on his love of coffee, and hatred for tea. This preference could not be argued in any way to be a choice made by him, we do not choose what we like, but simply do. Whether our preferences are based on nature or nurture is an ongoing debate, but regardless of the final conclusion, as long as our opinions are based on either of the two options, we would be seen to be determined. Nature is not in our control, neither on the other hand, is nurture. If our personalities are based on environmental or genetic factors and nothing else then our actions are surely determined. This position is extremely convincing and was famously used by Clarence Darrow to prevent two murderers from receiving the death penalty, he argued that they where a product of their upbringing and as such could not be held morally responsible for their actions. This meant, while they could be jailed to prevent threat to society, they could not be punished with the death penalty. The viewpoint of Determinism, while convincing, is by no means universally accepted. The argument seems to go against our intuitions that we are free -although it is notable at this point that our intuitions themselves are philosophically worthless, we cannot argue for an element of truth on the grounds that we feel it is true- and is seemingly incompatible with the view of a God who punishes and rewards his creations with heaven and hell. If our actions are predetermined, then it seems that punishment in hell would be arbitrary. God would simply be creating people in a flawed way, and then punishing them for his poor skills of creation. Needless to say, this viewpoint is not accepted by many Christians and so there have been many arguments for a lack of determinism in philosophy. The belief of Libertarianism, is that we are completely free; in the words of Jean-Paul Sartre I am not free not to be free. Though Sartres beliefs on free will were more assertions than arguments of proofs, he summarises the Libertarian view point perfectly. All our actions are completely freely chosen, our only confinement is that we cannot be confined. Libertarianism has the difficult task of explaining how it is possible to defend non-determined choices in an environment where all things seem to be determined by cause and effect. As already stated, if our personality is held to be nothing but a result of nature of nurture, then determinism must be accepted as a matter of logical consistency. From this, many Libertarians would stipulate the existence of a super-natural element to our personality. For example, if one were to believe in a soul, then it is possible to argue the physical laws of cause and effect have no bearing on our actions. This does seem to contradict fairly obvious observable evidence. Psychology has frequently found causes for human behaviour, and it is difficult to explain the consistency and successes of this particular scientific discipline if we do not accept that our choices are determined in some way. One of the more successful attempts of Libertarianism to discredit Determinism is the pointing to laws of physics that do not seem to obey causality. Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle shows distinct examples of elements of nature acting randomly, and not due to cause and effect. There are two main criticisms that can be made of this argument; One, that this principle only functions on an minute level, while actual objects such as people still obey determined laws of physics (although science has proven the principle can be amplified to affect people), and; Two, that even where actions random, there would still not be free will, while we would not live in a predetermined environment, we would still live in a (randomly) determined environment. If one was to roll a dice in order to decide the actions a prisoner should take, they would not be considered free by any means. The fundamental flaw of Libertarianism, is that when we examine how it would work, it seems to collapse. As all choices are made according to our personality, a serial killer, is only so because he has a serial killers personality. This statement would suggest determinism and could only be argued against in two ways: Firstly, we could state that the serial killer has no personality, this however, seems nearly impossible to uphold. Without personality, we would have no preferences and without preferences we could not make any choice at all. Asking someone who has no preference of good over evil, or pleasure over pain, to make a moral decision would be rather like asking someone whether they prefer white to white. Without personality, we would not be able to make any choice at all, as no options would appeal to us over others. It could be argued, that decisions can still be made according to rationalism, but as rationalism and logic are consistent discipline this would make our actions even more predictable and un-chosen than determinism suggests. So this argument cannot be used to defend Libertarianism. Secondly, we could suggest that the Serial-Killer was in some way in control of his personality. That he chose his preference of evil over good. This again fails. As we have already stated, choices cannot be made without personality, so to choose a personality we would require a personality for us to choose, this initial personality would determine the personality we chose. We could attempt to argue that this initial personality was chosen, but very soon we would have to give way to infinite regression. With this in mind, Libertarianism and the suggestion that our choices are anything but pre-determined or random, is not only completely incompatible with the current model of physics and psychology, but more importantly is incompatible with choice itself (as choice requires preference, preference designates personality which in turn suggests determinism). Libertarianism is a self defeating system in that it requires an absence of will to prove free will, which would be rendered useless without will. There is also a logical argument against Libertarianism. J.J.C Smart points out that there are two possible states of things, i.e. determinism or indeterminism. Either determinism is true, or indeterminism is true, these exhaust all possible philosophical options. Determinism would prevent a Libertarian view as our choices are predetermined, indeterminism would seem to prevent Libertarian view also, as our choices are random and thus not controlled or free. From this argument, we can see that a Libertarian argument for free will is impossible. It seems undeniable therefore, that all our choices are pre-determined -or in the least part random, whether our choices are in fact pre-determined or random is largely down to physicists to discover, currently it seems to be that we are in fact pre-determined, but this cannot be assured without knowledge of all physics. Even if our choices are not predetermined, what they are not -as has been argued in the course of this essay- is freely chosen, at least according to the viewpoint of free will presented by libertarianism. But what would the effects of this be? Hard determinism would argue that we cannot claim to possess free will in a deterministic environment. The problem with this position seems to be that we have defined free will incorrectly. The view of free-will as indifference, has in the course of this essay been demonstrated as problematic, and if we adopt this view of free-will then hard determinism would seem an agreeable viewpoint, the problem is, that this seems an utterly meaningless way of discussing free will. Free will does not appear to refer to the ability of will to change itself, when we refer to a free lion, we do not mean it is free to change to a tiger or a bird, we simply mean it is free to act according to its nature. It would therefore seem to be more useful to discuss free will in the sense of a will being able to act itself out, we are free if we could have chosen otherwise HAD our will been different. This Compatibilist approach adopted by David Hume seems to allow us to discuss free will in a meaningful way, within what seems to be a predetermined environment.

Social Justice In Education :: essays papers

Social Justice In Education â€Å"Social Justice in Education† by R. W. Connell discusses the role of education in society and the implications that social justice issues have on education. Connell begins by establishing that education and social justice can be examined separately yet they are inescapably linked through the social medium of their implementation. â€Å"Education concerns schools, colleges and universities, whose business is to pass knowledge on to the next generation. Social justice is about income, employment, pensions or physical assets like housing.†(Connell, 1993) Three points validating the equal importance of social justice and the education system to people of all delineations are: 1.) in Western society public schools are key forums of social interaction and comprise some of the largest social institutions 2.) educational institutions are highly economic bodies and have become â€Å"major public assets† (Connell, 1993) 3.) teaching becomes a vehicle by which so ciety is ultimately determined and has a great influence over society’s morality. Connell describes the meaning of justice in education as being â€Å"a question of fairness in distribution†¦ equality.†(Connell, 1993) â€Å"Justice cannot be achieved by distributing the same†¦ standard good to†¦ all social classes.†(Connell, 1993) By stating this, Connell summarizes that in the attempt to achieve equality, unequal means must be employed. The implications for teaching presented by Connell’s article are immense. The concept of equality in education and the equality of access to education are matters that are determined by the social constructs of the society in which we live. The notion of equality in education means that educators must approach all material and subject matter with a premise of unbiased predetermination. Music, math, science, fine arts, English, Japanese, history, etc†¦ must all be considered on a par. Our current educational system does not treat all subjects as equal in our public education system. The stereotypical reading, writing and arithmetic (primary subjects) take precedence over the fine arts and like subjects (secondary subjects). Social justice criteria as presented in this article, establish that economic variables are a means of determination for favouritism within the educational institution. Where the primary subjects receive ensured funding, the secondary subjects rec eive funding when deemed viable. This creates inequality at the very base of the institution itself. The result is degradation to all facets of the educational system. â€Å"The moral quality of education is inevitably affected by the moral character of educational institutions.

Laws of England and Wales Essay

â€Å"The defendant who seeks to avoid criminal liability on the basis that s/he was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the alleged crime must have a defence that falls within one of the following, legally recognised, categories: Insanity, Diminished Responsibility or Automatism. While, at one level or another, these â€Å"mental disorder defences† share common characteristics, they each differ significantly. Unfortunately, this point does not appear to be fully appreciated in English Law.† Discuss the validity of this statement. Inherent in our legal system is an idea of culpability. The word itself embodies notions of moral responsibility and blame. There are two elements that will allow us to determine whether or not someone is to be considered culpable. The first is that the person on whom we wish to apportion blame is an actual agent of harm as opposed to a mere causer. That is to say that they are instrumental in an action and are not simply a victim of a spasm or similar associated condition. The second is that he/she has the capacity to understand the laws and moral order that exist within society. Hart’s principles of justice assert that ‘a moral license to punish is needed by society and unless a man has the capacity and fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law, its penalties ought not be applied to him.† Such deep-rooted notions of culpability have necessitated development in the area of defences to ensure that those who fall outside of the legally recognised parameters of accountability are afforded ‘protection’. Amongst such defences are Insanity, Automatism and Diminished responsibility. This essay will identify the similarities and differences of these defences by exploring their theoretical foundations and determine whether, in practice, they are sufficiently understood by the courts to achieve their desired end. The theoretical basis for an insanity defence is embedded in the notions of fair opportunity as discussed above. It is felt that the insane man is ‘too far removed from normality to make us angry with him’. The impetus of the law and its functions might well be considered outside of his comprehension and similarly, so too might the moral implications of his act. Therefore, it would not be either ‘efficacious or equitable’ to hold such a man criminally  responsible . As Duff remarks of the potential insane defendant â€Å"if she cannot understand what is being done to her, or why it is being done, or how it is related as a punishment to her past offence, her punishment becomes a travesty?†. Therefore, if a defence of insanity is successful the defendant will be given a ‘special verdict’ namely ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. Although this special verdict may bring indefinite detention (a fact which is reconciled in theor y by ‘compelling considerations of public interest’ ) it still serves to reflect a lack of culpability and therefore, blame. The basis on which the non-insane automatism defence is founded is somewhat more fundamental than that of insanity. It was developed to exculpate those who had been the victim of events rather than those who had fallen foul to circumstance . A plea of automatism is ‘not merely a denial of fault, or of responsibility. It is more a denial of authorship’ in the sense that the automaton is in no way instrumental in any criminal act. Lord Dilhorne remarked in Alphacell that â€Å"an inadvertent and unintended act without negligence? might be said, not caused’. Others have described such acts as ‘acts of god’. It is with this class of act that the defence of automatism is concerned – acts which might be said seen as ‘inconsistent with the requirement of an actus reus’ . This lack-of-instrumentality concept is reflected by the fact that on a finding of automatism a defendant will be granted an unqualified acquittal by the courts. Detenti on is unnecessary for as well being blameless, the automaton presents no future threat to society. Whilst Insanity and Automatism serve as general defences in law, Diminished responsibility operates only as a defence to murder. It offers those ‘bordering on insanity’ the opportunity to argue that at the time of the killing they were ‘suffering from such abnormality of mind’ so as to ‘substantially impair their mental responsibility’. If such an argument is successful (all other things being equal) the potential murderer will be convicted of manslaughter and hence will escape the mandatory life sentence that a finding of murder brings. The defence’s existence is justified (much like insanity) by notions of responsibility and blame. The doctrine, it was felt, ‘was needed to reflect the view that where there was less responsibility there ought to be less punishment.† Despite some clear differences in the three defences’ theoretical foundations and intentions, it could be said that technically they have become somewhat confused in law. Discussion will now turn to the two automatism defences before then going on to examine diminished responsibility in context. Whilst both automatism defences are grounded in the idea that ‘where there is no responsibility there should be no blame,’ policy reasons have necessitated their independent development. Because of this, the person who seeks to raise automatism as a defence is subject to a very tight definitional distinction. This tight definitional distinction between automatism and insanity is highlighted by Glanville Williams when he describes non-insane automatism as ‘any abnormal state of consciousness†¦.while not amounting to insanity.’ Such statements offer little definitional worth, as to understand automatism we must first understand insanity and this, as will become clear, is no easy task. The contemporary framework of the insanity defence can be found in M’Naghten’s Case where Lord Tindal authoritatively ruled that?: â€Å"?to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.† Subsequent development of a non-insane automatism defence, for reasons discussed above, necessitated judicious refinement of these insanity parameters to insure that those who sought to invoke the former were deserving . Therefore, considerable onus was placed upon the meaning of the rules, especially the phrase ‘disease of the mind’. First, it was decided that ‘mind’ referred to the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding and not simply the organic mass that is the brain. Then, in Sullivan, (the defendant was charged with assault which, he  claimed, was the result of the post-ictal stage of an epileptic seizure) the definition expanded to catch transient and intermittent impairment of the mind. It was held that the permanence of a disease ‘cannot on any rational ground be relevant to the application by the courts of the M’Naghten rules’. This finding ran contrary to contemporary medical definitions and began to impinge upon the design of the non-insane automatism defence: that being to catch one-off, faultless incidents of automatism. Perhaps more significantly, Sullivan continued to develop Quick on what is now thought to be the defining boundary between the two defences, that of internal and external causes. This distinction was cemented in Burgess where Lord Lane explicitly referred to the difference between internal and external causes as the point on which the ‘case depends, as others have depended in the past’ The defendant in Burgess was a sleepwalker who assaulted a friend whilst in a somnambulistic state. It was held that somnambulism was a disease of the mind under the M’Naghten rules largely because it was considered a ‘pathological’ (and therefore, internal) condition by expert witnesses in cross-examination. While, to some, this internal/external distinction ‘makes good sense,’ to others its effect is wholly inappropriate, as it fudges the boundaries between the theoretical rationales of insane and non-insane automatism. Irene Mackay, for example (as well as pointing to contradictory obiter ) attacks the distinction with reference to its effect. She contends that sleep ‘can hardly be called an illness, disorder or abnormal condition. It is a perfectly normal condition.’ Of interest here, Graham Virgo points to anecdotal evidence that cheese might cause sleepwalking. If such evidence could be substantiated, the somnambulist could potentially escape a special verdict by virtue of the fact that eating cheese would be considered an external cause. Such a consideration is far from easily reconcilable with the aforementioned notions of blame and responsibility as expounded by Hart’s principles of justice. Mackay continues to attack Burgess on a second defining point. She contends that the court failed to properly adopt the definition of ‘disease of the  mind’ as put forward by Lord Denning in Bratty – namely that it is â€Å"any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur.† Considering statistical evidence showing that no one had ever appeared before a court twice charged with somnambulistic violence, Mackay remarks ‘something which is prone to recur must be at least ‘inclined to recur or have a tendency to recur or be to some extent likely to recur.’ Despite such protestations, current medical opinion is that sleepwalking is caused by internal factors and may be likely to recur . Therefore it is suitable for M’Naghten insanity as defined. The result of these calculated distinctions between the two defences is that ‘epileptics, sleepwalkers, those suffering from arteriosclerosis and diabetics during a hyperglycaemic episode, may all now be regarded as insane.’ This is surely an unacceptable position. After all, such people appear to fit far more comfortably within the (theoretical) realms of automatism than insanity. They are rational people, capable of recognising rule following situations, who are (largely) the victims of one off incidents of involuntariness. If we are to label a diabetic insane because they neglected to take their medication, are we to do the same with one who gets a migraine from omitting to take aspirin? The difference of cause is the resultant harm and the need for the courts to protect society. Incidentally, close scrutiny of the M’Naghten rules leads us to conclude that where a defendant’s inability to recognise he was doing something wrong was due to something other than a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind he would generally have no defence at all. Things do not get any clearer when the defence of Diminished Responsibility is brought into the frame. The statutory provision for the defence is found in Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 and provides that a person shall not be convicted of murder: â€Å"If he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental  responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.† The problems begin with semantics and normative questions of degree: what qualifies as ‘abnormality of mind,’ how much is ‘substantially’ and what is ‘mental responsibility’? Even debates on the questions have offered little assistance. For example, the Government, in an attempt to explain the key term, said that ‘abnormality of mind’ referred to conditions ‘bordering on insanity’ while excluding ‘the mere outburst of rage or jealousy’. Such an explanation is obviously of little worth considering that ‘the response of judges and psychiatrists?[to the section]? have ranged from the very generous to the very strict’. In fact the courts it seems, have entertained ‘practically any ground where it was thought morally inappropriate to convict the defendant of murder’. For example, psychopaths, reactive depressives , alcoholics and those in ‘disassociated states’ or suffering from ‘irresistible impulses’ have all been brought within the protective scope of the section. Lord Parker in Byrne, also attempting to clarify the section’s ambit, said that it dealt with ‘partial insanity or being on the border line of insanity’. He went on to add that ‘Inability to exercise will-power to control physical acts? is? sufficient to entitle the accused to the benefit of this section; difficulty in controlling his acts? may be’. Confusions are evident here for, as Smith and Hogan note: ‘A man whose impulse is irresistible bears no moral responsibility for his act, for he has no choice; a man whose impulse is much more difficult to resist than that of an ordinary man bears a diminished degree of moral responsibility for his act’ It would appear then, that the former should be acquitted as insane rather than have his punishment mitigated. However, if the inability to control his acts is not caused by a ‘defect of reason’ or ‘disease of the mind’ then the defendant has no defence in insanity. In this respect therefore, the defence of diminished responsibility appears to be patching up the deficiencies of M’Naghten; acting as ‘a device for circumventing the embarrassments that flow from a mandatory sentence,’ or the stigma attached to a finding of insanity, by allowing judges to â€Å"follow in a common sense way their sense of  fairness.† Greiw, writing in 1988 comments on the section. He suggests that the section is not to be seen as a definitional aid rather it is ‘to be seen as legitimising an expression of the decision-maker’s personal sense of the proper boundaries between murder and manslaughter’. The result of the lax and open wording has allowed the defence of diminished responsibility to be used almost as a catch-all excuse, spanning, and adding to, the defences of insane and non-insane automatism. It has been able to accommodate states of mind and circumstance that would be insufficient for either automatism or insanity whilst at the same time justifying this accommodation by virtue of the increased severity of a murder charge. To some this position is considered entirely unacceptable and contrary to the theories of blame and responsibility discussed hereto. Sparks for example, comments ‘to say that we are less willing to blame?a man if he does something wrong, surely does not mean: we are willing to blame him less, if he does something wrong.’ It would seem however, that due to the inadequacies of M’Naghten and the acceptance that some states of mind falling short of insanity should be considered mitigatory, the courts had little choice but to develop the defence of diminished responsibility in this way. From the issues discussed in this essay it is clear that whilst, in theory, the three defences of Insanity, Automatism and Diminished Responsibility, do indeed exhibit differences, in practice they have become somewhat amalgamated. This is probably due to two factors: First, it must be accepted that ‘there is no sharp dividing line between sanity and insanity, but that the two extremes? shade into one another by imperceptible gradations.’ This proposition leads us to conclude that first, the problem is one of definition. Second, the courts are aware that ‘pleading a blackout is one of the first refuges of a guilty conscience and is a popular excuse’. Therefore, they have tended to view the problem of involuntariness ‘with great circumspection and have adopted a restrictive approach as to when there should be a complete exemption from liability’. In order to balance this definitional problem with the requirement of  certainty, whilst ensuring that only the deserving are completely acquitted, the law has had no alternative but to define distinct parameters. It is these parameters which have both caused the fudging of the two automatism defences and necessitated the creation of a diminished responsibility defe nce. Whilst, in some respects, this amalgamation is unacceptable, its effect has been to provide blanket coverage for those defendants suffering from either a mental disorder, disassociated condition or episode of sudden involuntariness. Far from saying that the law has failed to ‘fully appreciate’ the differences it appears that the courts, due to restrictions, have simply created ad hoc a range of defences whose purpose is to reflect, on a continuum, impeachable notions of culpability. Bibliography. Books 1. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed., Oxford, 1995) 2. Clarkson. C.M.V. & Keating. H.M. Criminal Law. Text and Materials. (4th ed., 1998, Sweet & Maxwell) 3. Hart. H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility, (1968, Oxford) 4. Smith , J.C. B. Hogan., Criminal Law (6th Edition, 1988, London, Butterworths.) 5. Williams. G., Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed., Stevens & Sons. 1983) Articles Dell, Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered. [1982] Crim.L.R. 809 Duff. R.A., Trial and Punishments J.L.S.S. 1986, 31(11), 433 Goldstein. A., The insanity Defense (1967) Griew. E., The future of Diminished Responsibility. Crim. L.R. 1988, Feb, 75-87 Laurie. G.T., Automatism and Insanity in the Laws of England and Scotland. Jur. Rev. 1995, 3, 253-265 Mackay. I., The Sleepwalker is Not Insane. M.L.R. 1992, 55(5), 714-720 Padfield. N.,Exploring a quagmire: insanity and automatism. C.L.J. 1989, 48(3), 354-357 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmnd. 8932 (1949-1953) Smith. J.C., Case and Comment. R. v. Hennessy. (1989) 86(9) L.S.G. 41; (1989) 133 S.J. 263 (CA) Smith. K.J.M. & Wilson. W., Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: Reworking Hart’s Theory of Excuses ? The English Judicial Response. O.J.L.S. 1993, 13(1), 69-98 Sparks. Diminished Responsibility in theory and Practice (1964) 27 M.L.R 9 Virgo. G., Sanitising Insanity ? Sleepwalking and Statutory Reform C.L.J. 1991, 50(3), 386-388 Cases 1. Alphacell [1972] 2 All ER 475 2. Burgess [1991] 2 W.L.R. 106 C.O.A. (Criminal Division) 3. Byrne [1960] 3 All ER 1 4. Cooper v. McKenna [1960] Q.L.R 406 5. Hennessy (1989) 89 Cr.App.R 10, CA 6. Kemp [1956] 3 All ER 249; [1957] 1 Q.B.399 7. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 C & F, 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718. 8. Quick and Paddison [1973] Q.B. 910 9. Seers [1985] Crim.L.R, 315 10. Sullivan [1984] A.C. 156 (House of Lords) 11. Tandy [1988] Crim.L.R 308 12. Tolson (1889) Legislation 1. Homicide Act. 1957. 2. Trial of Lunatics Act 1883

The Spinning Mule Invention by Samuel Crompton

A spinning mule is a device that is an essential part of the textile industry. Invented in the 18th century  by Samual Crompton, the innovative machine spun textile fibers into yarn using an intermittent process that transformed the way yarn was manufactured, making the process much faster, easier—and more profitable. The History of Spinning Fiber into Yarn In early civilizations, yarn was spun using simple handheld tools: the distaff, which held the raw fiber material (such as wool, hemp, or cotton) and the spindle, onto which the twisted fibers were wound. The spinning wheel, a Middle-Eastern invention whose origins can be traced back as far as the 11th century, was the first step toward the mechanization of the textile spinning industry. The technology is thought to have traveled from Iran to India and was eventually introduced to Europe. The first illustration of the device dates from about 1270. The addition of a foot pedal has been credited to a workman from the town of Brunswick, located in the Saxony region of Germany in the year 1533. This allowed a spinner to power the wheel with one foot, leaving the hands free for spinning. Another 16th-century improvement was the flyer, which twisted the yarn as it was being spun, speeding up the process considerably. Europeans, however, were not the only ones to come up with innovations for spinning textiles. Water-powered spinning wheels were common in China as early as the 14th century. Samuel Crompton Puts a New Spin on Spinning Samuel Crompton was born in 1753 in Lancashire, England. After his father passed away, he helped support his family by spinning yarn. Soon enough, Crompton became all too familiar with the limitations of the industrial textile technology currently in use. He began to think of ways he could improve the process to make it faster and more efficient.  Crompton supported his research and development working as a violinist at the Bolton Theatre for pennies a show, plowing all of his wages into his realizing his invention. In 1779, Crompton was rewarded with an invention he called the spinning mule. The machine combined the moving carriage of the spinning jenny with the rollers of a water frame. The name mule was derived from the fact that like a mule—which is a cross between a horse and a donkey—his invention was also a hybrid. In the operation of a spinning mule, during the draw stroke, the roving (a long, narrow bunch of carded fibers) is pulled through and twisted; on the return, it is wrapped onto the spindle. Once perfected, the spinning mule gave the spinner great control over the weaving process, and many different types of yarn could be produced. In 1813, the mule was upgraded with the addition of a variable speed control invented by William Horrocks. The mule was a game changer for the textile industry: It could spin thread of much finer gauge, better quality, and at a higher volume than thread spun by hand—and the better the  thread, the higher the profit in the marketplace. The fine threads spun on the mule sold for at least three times the price of coarser threads. In addition, the mule could hold multiple spindles, which greatly increased output. Patent Troubles Many 18th-century inventors encountered difficulty over their patents and Crompton was no exception. In the more than five years it took Compton to invent and perfect his spinning mule, he failed to obtain a patent.  Seizing on the opportunity, famed industrialist Richard Arkwright  took out his own patent on the spinning mule, even though he hadnt had anything to do with its creation.   Crompton filed a complaint regarding his patent claim with the British Commons Committee in 1812. The committee concluded that the method of reward to an inventor, as generally accepted in the eighteenth century, was that the machine, etc., should be made public and that a subscription should be raised by those interested, as a reward to the inventor. Such a philosophy may have been practical in the days when inventions required little  capital  to develop, however, it was decidedly inadequate once the industrial  revolution got underway and investment capital became crucial to the development and production of any substantial technical improvement. Unfortunately for Crompton, British law lagged far behind the new paradigm of industrial progress.   Crompton was eventually able to prove the financial harm hed suffered by gathering evidence of all the factories that relied on his invention—more than four million spinning mules were in use at the time—for which hed received no compensation. Parliament agreed to a settlement of  £5,000 pounds. Crompton attempted to go into business with the funds he was finally awarded but his efforts were unsuccessful. He died in 1827.